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Abstract
The nature of the scientific method is controversial with claims that a single
scientific method does not even exist. However the scientific method does exist. It is
the building of logical and self consistent models to describe nature. The models are
constrained by past observations and judged by their ability to correctly predict new
observations and interesting phenomena. Observations do not prove models correct
or falsify them but rather provide a means to rank models: models with more ability
to predict observations are ranked higher. The observations must be carefully done
and reproducible to minimize errors. They exist independent of the models but
acquire their meaning from their context within a model. Model assumptions that
do not lead to testable predictions are rejected as unnecessary. Both observations
and models should be peer reviewed for error control. Consistency with observation
and reason places constraints on all claims to knowledge including religious.
1 Introduction
The root problem in science is how do we obtain reliable information on the nature and
properties of the real world, whatever the real world may be. This is essentially the
question of epistemology: what is knowledge and how is it obtained. On the one hand
there is the real world, presumably distinct from the mind. On the other hand, there is
the mind which wants information on the nature and properties of the real world. The
question is how do we connect the two. There is a limited number of tools at our disposal
to address this issue, only four: observations, pure thought, innate knowledge, and divine
revelation. The use of observations to learn about the real world, done correctly, leads
to science. Done incorrectly it leads to superstition, pseudoscience or abnormal science.
The bulk of this paper is addressed to the question of the use of observation to obtain
knowledge about the nature of the real world. It builds on the examples and arguments
given in ref. 1 and can be considered a more formal companion to that work.
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2 Basic Epistemology
Following Descartes, we have the idea that we can be certain of very little and start with
the position of extreme skepticism. Perhaps much of what we regard as reality is an
illusion: a dream that does not correspond to reality or the work of a demon deceiving
us. As the next step we rely on Descartes’ famous statement:2 I think therefore I am.
Hence we have two facts. To this we can add a few others like: I observe. The theorems
of pure mathematics probablya also fall into the category of certain knowledge. This
is not knowledge about the real world but knowledge within the confines of the logical
systems of mathematics. One piece of certain knowledge is that there is very little other
certain knowledge (see discussion in Sec. 4). Even that there is a real world outside
the mind must be held as uncertain: this manuscript may be a figment of your, the
reader’s, imagination. This extreme is referred to as solipsism. In science what are we
to make of claims like Isaac Asimov’s3 that he was happy to have lived at a time when
the basic working of the universe is known? In theology, what we to make of claims of
proofs of God’s existence or non-existence? What does all this imply about the nature of
knowledge? Some would claim that to be knowledge a thought must be justified, be true
and be believed.4 The problem is that, as just argued, very little is known absolutely
to be true. So if knowledge consists only of things that are known absolutely to be true
very little remains of knowledge outside pure mathematics.
How do we proceed? We make assumptions and test these assumptions. The assump-
tions we call models. Knowledge consists of model building and testing and is always
tentative and as argued below frequently approximate. As discussed in Sec. 3 concepts
like dog, cat, and knowledge can also be considered as contributing to knowledge. But
we must for the most part give up the idea of sure and certain knowledge. Thus we start
model building. A first, frequently made assumption is that there is a reality outside
the mind. A second possible assumption is on the existence of God. Since all nontrivial
knowledge about the world, as a matter of principle, is uncertain everyone should, at
this level, be an agnostic. This concept of agnosticism is not very useful so instead we
can define theist, deist, agnostic and atheist by the properties of their preferred models.
The preferred model (sometimes called controlling narrative) of theists would have God
actively involved in human affairs or the world, for the deist a God not involved in human
affairs and so on. We proceed step by step to make assumptions or models and test them.
The assumptions and models always remain tentative and frequently approximate. Thus
Asimov’s knowledge is tentative and approximate but never-the-less comprehensive and
useful. Testing procedures are described in the following sections.
3 Pure thought, innate knowledge, and divine reve-
lation
Before addressing the use of observation to learn about the real world we turn to the
other three tools. The first of these is pure thought. As a pure abstraction not related to
aThere are claims that logic is itself empirically determined and hence uncertain.
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experience, this would be mathematics which relies only on logic (arguably logic is not
empirically based). As a means to learn about the real world, pure thought would be
synthetic a priori knowledge as proposed5 by Kant (b. 1724, d. 1804). Synthetic a priori
knowledge is nontrivial knowledge about the world obtained without recourse to obser-
vation. The idea of synthetic a priori knowledge was dealt a serious if not mortal blow
when Euclidean geometry, Kant’s archetypal example of synthetic a priori knowledge,
was shown to be not a priori true with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and to
be only approximately true as a description of the universe’s local geometry with the
advent of general relativity. Innate knowledge would be Plato’s ideals or forms and also
perhaps logic. Plato’s ideals do not exist as such. However they address a real concern:
How does the continuing concept of “dog” arise from all the various and changing exam-
ples of “dog” we encounter. In the case of a concept like dog, the human mind appears
very good at creating general concepts from a series of specific instances. The precise
definition of a concept like “dog” frequently has “fuzzy” edges since it is not clear where
the concept like dog ends and a concept like “wolf”, “jackal” or “hyena” begins. The
concepts are empirically determined by the human mind’s marvelous pattern recognition
ability and in science they are judged by their usefulness in creating and testing models.
Divine revelation, if it exists, could be the most reliable source of knowledge since it
would give information not limited by the constraints of normal sensory input. However,
divine revelation is communicated using words and language which brings it into the realm
of observations — either sight or sound. In addition words derive there meaning from their
context even more than observations, and are less precise than mathematics. Narratives
also derive much of their meaning from their context. It is sometimes unclear if a given
narrative is meant as history, parable, humor or perhaps all three; the determination
depending on its context which may be lost, rather than purely internal evidence. Words
also change their meaning over time: “let” at the time of King James I was used to mean
“prevent” rather than allow. In addition when divine revelation, in the form of sacred
texts for example, are translated from one language to another subtlety and meaning
are lost. Even copying texts can introduce errors and “helpful” scribes have been known
to “improve” manuscripts. Moreover many, including deists and atheists (in the strong
sense of the word), would claim that divine revelation does not even exist. Even if it
does exist, there are many conflicting claims as to what is the correct divine revelation.
Some of the latter uncertainty is related to the interpretation of words and narratives
as illustrated by the disagreements among the various Christian denominations. The
overriding problem with divine revelation as a source of knowledge is this: Which, if any,
of the many conflicting purported divine revelations are valid and how do you tell?
Observation and reason provide objective criteria to choose between the conflicting
claims of divine revelations. The argument6 is essentially that of John Locke(b. 1632,
d. 1704): “Revelation can not be admitted against the clear evidence of reason.” and
“If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm or extravagency
in religion can be contradicted.” Reason should be supplemented with observation. If a
purported divine revelation claims that when stones are dropped they fall upwards we
are safe in rejecting this as not being a true divine revelation. A similar point was made
by Augustine(b. 354, d.430):7
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Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens,
and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars
and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the
sun and moon, the cycles of the years and seasons, about the kinds of animals,
shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge he holds to as being certain
from reason and experience. Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing
for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy
Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means
to prevent such an embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast
ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn. The shame is not so much
that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside the household
of the faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss
of those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized
and rejected as unlearned men.
This is consistent with Deuteronomy 18:228 “When a prophet speaks in the name of
the Lord, if the thing does not come about or come true, that is a thing that the Lord
has not spoken. The prophet has spoken it presumptuously: you shall not be afraid
of him.” If someone makes a claim based on his understanding of divine revelation
that is inconsistent with observation he/she is a false prophet and the purported divine
revelation is invalid. The example of a dropped stone given above is extreme, but what
about the shape of the earth? Even more pertinent is the nature of planetary motion.
Do the planets circle the earth or the sun? In the early sixteen hundreds, the Catholic
Church and some of its theologians argued strongly that the claim the earth circled the
sun was in direct contradiction with divine revelation and a threat to Christianity. Based
on observation and Deuteronomy 18:22 we see that they spoke presumptuously and were
false prophets. Young earth creationists and other people of that ilk fall into a similar
category and speak presumptuously. They are not to be feared as spokesmen for God.
Or in the words of Augustine, what they doing is “disgraceful and dangerous”.
Observations can, however, be made consistent with a young age for the universe
through the Omphalos hypothesis,9 but the cure is worse than the disease. The Om-
phalos hypothesis says that while the universe is young it has been created with all the
appearance of an old universe. The Omphalos hypothesis, raises significant and disturb-
ing questions for both science and theology. Consequently it was rejected by all sides
when first published. In science it is the question of equivalent models1 that make the
same predictions for all observations but are internally different. Such models can only
be discriminated between using simplicity or a similar criteria. Thus the Omphalos hy-
pothesis challenged the idea of the times that scientific induction could give absolute
truth. In theology, the Omphalos hypothesis raises the question if special creation can
occur without some false history being implied. The answer9 from Philip Gosse(b. 1810.
d. 1888) is that it cannot: a creation at a finite point in time, by its very nature, implies
God must implant a false history. This has tended to be rejected by Christian apologists
even more emphatically than an old universe and with good reason. It portrays God as a
deceiver who planted false histories. Charles Kingsley, author of The Water-Babies and
a friend of Gosse, was asked to review Gosse’s book. Refusing, he wrote to Gosse:
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Shall I tell you the truth? It is best. Your book is the first that ever made
me doubt [the doctrine of absolute creation], and I fear it will make hundreds
do so. Your book tends to prove this - that if we accept the fact of absolute
creation, God becomes God-the-Sometime-Deceiver. I do not mean merely
in the case of fossils which pretend to be the bones of dead animals; but in
. . . your newly created Adam’s navel, you make God tell a lie. It is not my
reason, but my conscience which revolts here . . . I cannot . . . believe that God
has written on the rocks one enormous and superfluous lie for all mankind.
(reproduced from Hardin10 and the Wikipedia11).
If God made the rocks lie can his words be trusted? Presumably notb and thus in the
end the Omphalos hypothesis would destroy what it sets out to preserve — the reliability
of the literal interpretation of Genesis. At one fell swoop it unwittingly questioned and
seriously challenged absolute knowledge in both science and Christian fundamentalism.
4 The Scientific Method
Science is the construction of parsimious, internally consistent models that can reliably
predict future observations. With this definition the rest of the scientific method fol-
lows. It also sidesteps questions about what the real world ultimately is and even the
nature of truth itself. This definition is not the usual definition of science. There is
nothing here about explaining or understanding phenomena, nothing about naturalism
either methodological or otherwise nor anything about scientific induction or falsification.
The alternate approaches to science are either approximations to this approach, partial
descriptions that emphasis one aspect of science or in a few cases simply wrong. The
relationship between other approaches to science and the one given here is the topic of
Sec. 5
Observations are any sensory input. At the simplest level they are direct sensory
input — sight, sound, taste, smell and touch. At the next level we use instruments to
augment our senses, for example Galileo’s telescope. Observations also include controlled
experiments where the experimental arrangements are actively manipulated in order to
isolate different effects and test specific aspects of the models. The experiments are de-
signed to maximize the information that can be obtained while eliminating uninteresting
and spurious effects. An extreme example is the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron
Collider (CERN, Geneva, Switzerland) which is about the size of a five story building
and involves approximately 1500 physicists from 36 countries. As the instrument gets
larger and more complex the observations become more model dependent. A model of
the apparatus is needed or even models of parts of the apparatus. However, even when
the apparatus is as simple as Galileo’s telescope, a model is needed to understand its
behavior. One of the attacks against Galileo was that he was seeing an artifact of the
bEven without the Omphalos hypotheses a literal reading of Genesis challenges God’s veracity. Con-
trary to God’s statement in Genesis 2:17, Adam did not die the day he ate from the tree of the knowledge
of good and evil but rather, like the much maligned snake correctly stated, he acquired knowledge of
good and evil.
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telescope. A not unreasonable attack since telescopes can ideed add atrifacts, for exam-
ple, diffraction rings. Thus we have the idea that observations are not freestanding but
take on their meaning within the context of a model or models.
The term “model” is carefully chosen. It implies the approximate and tentative nature
of knowledge. It also avoids the ambiguity of the word “theory” which means something
different to many people than it does in science. A model, in the present usage, is anything
constructed in the mind that is used to describe and predict observations. Knowledge
consists two things. The first is the generation of useful concepts such as dog, cow, or
knowledge while the second is model building and testing. Model building is a creative
activity with relatively few useful guide lines while model testing is based on a model’s
efficacy in obtaining a given end and is usually more algorithmic. In science, models are
tested or judged by their ability to correctly predict observations. In religion, models are
judged by their ability to get the model’s adherent to heaven, enlightenment or nirvana.
However in practice this test is usually replaced by a test based on consistency with
a given sacred text or a given master’s teaching. In mathematics, modelsc are judged
purely by their logical consistency. In capitalism, models are judged by their ability to
generate wealth for the person using the model. In politics it is the model’s ability to get
people elected and in auto mechanics it is the model’s ability to aid in car repair. The
ability to make correct predictions is frequently important in judging models in religion
(for example the quote from Deuteronomy given above), capitalism and other areas.
The idea that we do not have absolute knowledge goes back at least to Socrates
(b. 470?,d. 399 BCE) with the idea of ironic modesty (from Plato’s Apologhma). Ironic
modesty is the claim, attributed to Socrates, that he was wiser than his contemporaries
because he alone realized how very little he knew. There were also Greek schools of
skeptics (Academic and Pyrrhonian for example) that claimed true knowledge, especially
empirical knowledge, was impossible. Rene´ Descartes (b. 1596, d. 1650) in the beginning
of his “Meditations” makes similar skeptical arguments (before making unwarranted as-
sumptions to get around the problem). David Hume (b. 1711, d. 1776) pointed out12
that one could never deduce a generalization valid for all instances from a finite series of
observations. Thus he showed scientific induction is invalid. This was largely ignored by
the scientific community for 200 years. The solution to all these problems follows from
the idea13 of Karl Popper(b. 1902, d. 1994) that all scientific models (or theories) are
tentative. This should be generalized to the idea that most knowledge is tentative and
approximation. The only exceptions are simple statements like: I am, I think, I observe
and perhaps a few others.
As Hume showed, models can not be proven correct. Despite Popper’s claims,13 in
most cases models cannot be falsified either.1 Thus observations neither prove models
correct nor disprove them. What observations do is provide the information necessary
for ranking models. Old models are displaced by newer models that are ranked higher
based on their ability to correctly predict observations. Paraphrasing the United States’
gun lobby: observations do not kill models, models do. This ranking of models is the
first part of the scientific method.
cIn mathematics a model would be the set of postulates and theorems that make up the logical system
under study.
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Comparing models is very much a part of what Popper actually proposed. For exam-
ple consider the quote14 from him:
Now there can be little doubt that all these essentialist views stand in the
strongest possible contrast to the methods of modern science. (I have the
empirical sciences in mind, not perhaps pure mathematics.) First, although
in science we do our best to find the truth, we are conscious of the fact that
we can never be sure whether we have got it. We have learnt in the past, from
many disappointments, that we must not expect finality. And we have learnt
not to be disappointed any longer if our scientific theories are overthrown;
for we can, in most cases, determine with great confidence which of any two
theories is the better one. We can therefore know that we are making progress;
and it is this knowledge that to most of us atones for the loss of the illusion
of finality and certainty. In other words, we know that our scientific theories
must always remain hypotheses, but that, in many important cases, we can
find out whether or not a new hypothesis is superior to an old one. For if they
are different, then they will lead to different predictions, which can often be
tested experimentally; and on the basis of such a crucial experiment, we can
sometimes find out that the new theory leads to satisfactory results where the
old one breaks down. Thus we can say that in our search for truth, we have
replaced scientific certainty by scientific progress. And this view of scientific
method is corroborated by the development of science. For science does not
develop by a gradual encyclopaedic accumulation of essential information, as
Aristotle thought) but by a much more revolutionary method; it progresses
by bold ideas, by the advancement of new and very strange theories (such as
the theory that the earth is not flat, or that ’metrical space’ is not flat), and
by the overthrow of the old ones.
Ranking implies that there must be at least two models to rank. This is not a
problem since there is always the default or null model that says all outcomes for a given
observation are equally possible. Thus any model that makes some correct predictions
but no false ones would rate higher than the null model. On the other hand a model
that makes only false predictions would rate lower than the null model. We can improve
the null model slightly by having it say that all past observations are the way they are
because that is the way they are and that any outcome for a future observation is possible.
This revised null model is scientifically equivalentd to the “Because God did it that way”
model.
Thinking in terms of models makes some concepts much clearer. For example, it is
meaningless to ask if a model airplane is a fact, rather one should ask how accurate the
model is. It cannot be one hundred per cent accurate since then it would be replica not
a model. Even replicas are rarely 100% accurate. A similar situation holds with most
models including scientific ones. Asking if Newtonian mechanics, general relativity or
evolution are facts is meaningless, an error of categories. One should ask how accurately
they describe and predict observations. Rather than fact or not fact, scientific models are
dsee ref. 1 for the definition of scientifically equivalent.
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judged on their ability to mirror reality; a mirroring that can not be exact since models
are constructions of the mind while reality presumably exists outside the mind. This
is very much in line with the skeptical denial of the possibility of absolute knowledge.
However, while models cannot be considered as absolutely true they can be judged and
ranked. Thus we have: Aristotelian dynamics, Newtonian mechanics, special relativity
and general relativity in order of increasing accuracy of the predictions for the motion of
macroscopic objects. In an absolute sense all these models are wrong since they do not
correctly predict observations on microscopic systems. In spite of not being absolutely
true, all these models make useful predictions for some range of observations. They are
probably approximations to some unknown model of everything — at least that is the
hope. Similarly we can rank animals reproducing after their kind and evolution based
on their ability to make predictions of future observations. Again both these models are
useful although evolution ranks higher based on its predictive ability. The ability to rank
models is the point missed by Socrates, the skeptics, Descartes and Hume. Even with
naive falsification, there is only a two level categorization, falsified or not falsified, rather
than a ranking.
The current approach to epistemology, with its emphasis on the tentative and ap-
proximate nature of knowledge, is anti-dogmatic: the absolute truth of fundamentalists
(either scientific or religious) is a mirage. Even the present description of the scientific
method and the nature of knowledge should be considered tentative and approximate.
Note this circumvents one of the problems with extreme skepticism. If all knowledge
is invalid then even the claim that “all knowledge is invalid” is invalid. Claiming all
knowledge is tentative and approximate does not lead to a similar contradiction.
What properties must a model have in order to be scientific? First we want to be
able to make unambiguous predictions. This implies that the models should make unique
predictions for some set of observations. To this end we want the models to be internally
consistent and logical so that they do not predict both this and that. At the very least
you need a well-define set of rules that unambiguously lead to testable predictions.
Parsimony or simplicity is also an important, indeed crucial, property of models. For
a given model it is always possible to make a more complicated model which makes the
same predictions. Comparison with observation can never discriminate between these
models. This is the problem the Omphalos hypothesis highlighted. Instead of having the
universe created 6000 years ago we could have it created last Tuesday or five minutes
ago. One can add such assumptions indefinitely: a universe created last Tuesday, invisible
unicorns, flying spaghetti monsters, etc. However since models are judged by their ability
to make predictions, this gains us nothing. Models should be stripped down to the
minimum assumptions consistent with maintaining their ability to make predictions. Or
rephrasing: The models are simplified by removing untestable assumptions. If nothing
else this makes the models easier to use. Thus models should be simple, logical and self-
consistent. It is the requirement of parsimony that eliminates the Omphalos hypothesis
and similar untestable hypotheses from consideration as science.
In order to predict future observations it is important to describe past observations.
This is an a posteriori statement rather than an a priori one. While there are few if
any hard and fast rules on how to construct models there is one very useful guideline:
The more one knows about past observations and the patterns in them the more likely
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one will be able to construct models that can predict future observations. Models that
incorporate patterns from past observations typically have more predictive power. Thus
to some extent, model formation is pattern recognition. Galileo recognized a pattern
in pendulum’s period: the period was independent of the amplitude of the motion. He
then used this to predict the periods for future observations. In this case, the pattern
is fairly obvious and the procedure looks like scientific induction (see Sec. 5). Most new
models in science arise from a careful, and frequently long, study of past observations.
The scientist has to decide which patterns in the observations are real and which of the
real patterns are important. However describing past observations and the patterns in
them is not enough, the real test of any scientific model is its ability to predict future
observations.
One of the first things one realizes in working with observations is that it is easy
to make mistakes. While an observation is never “wrong” it may be misinterpreted.
There are some visual impressions in my eyes but if it is a dog or a cat is a question of
interpretation. It may even be an hallucination and not a real visual impression. This is
also a question of interpretation. Since error and misinterpretation are ubiquitous, error
control is extremely important. Error control is the distinguishing characteristic between
science and superstition or pseudo-science. There are three main aspects of error control:
care, reproducibility and peer review. Double blind trails in medicine are an example of
the care required to obtain reliable results. Scientists are frequently criticized for the care
they take to control errors but this is necessary to prevent science from being overrun with
bogus results. Reproducibility is a major check on both error and fraud. Repetition is not
doing exactly the same experiment again and again. Rather, the subsequent experiments
should be as different as possible to eliminate common sources of error.
Reproducibility does not mean the scientific method cannot be used to study historical
events because the event cannot be reproduced. The model that Napoleon died of arsenic
poisoning can be tested by looking for arsenic in a currently existing sample of his hair.
Models based on stomach cancer would not have high levels of arsenic and thus can be
ranked lower if arsenic is found in high concentrations. The models of past events can
make predictions for future observations that can be tested. Other historical events, such
as the history of the earth, can be studied similarly.
Next for error control is peer review. This is a simple concept. The people who know
about a topic are peers of the person who did the original experiment and they look to
see if there are any errors. It is only the peers who would have the knowledge to spot
errors. If you want to know if a model about sheep farming is reasonable you ask a
sheep farmer. If the model is about Irish history you ask an historian specializing in Irish
history not a sheep farmer (although one could, in principle, be both sheep farmer and
an Irsih historian). If the model is about nuclear physics you ask a nuclear physicist.
Peer review is this idea applied in a systematic manner.
A model airplane by, its very nature, is never an exact replica of the original. Thus
it is always “wrong”. However we can compare different airplane models to see which is
the most accurate. We can also ask which is the most useful for a given museum display.
This may well not be the most accurate. The same considerations apply to scientific
models or indeed any models in the mind. By their very nature they are approximate
but the accuracy of different models can be compared models and ranked. Similarly the
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most accurate scientific model is frequently not the most useful for a given calculation.
Quantum theory is not used to calculate planetary motion.
5 The Pretenders
In this section we consider the relationship between other proposed descriptions of the
scientific method.
Appeal to Authority: Life is not long enough to do all observations and model cal-
culations by oneself. Thus, inevitably one has to rely on other people who may be
considered authorities. There is nothing wrong with this. The error occurs when the
authority is assumed infallible or nearly so. The late medieval church fell into this trap
with Aristotle. They took his word as the gospel truth and were caught by surprise when
his models of natural history were shown to be inferior to those developed by Galileo and
his contemporaries. The British physicists fell into the same trap with Newton. Taking
Newton as their authority rather than observations they fell behind their competitors
on the continent. In science careful, reproducible, peer reviewed observation must take
precedent over any other authority in judging models.
An additional comment on the medieval church and Aristotle is in order. In the twelve
hundreds the works of the classical scholars was rediscovered, in particular the philosophy
of Aristotle. Two of the early participants in this revival where Roger Bacon (b. 1214
d. 1294) and Thomas Aquinas (b. 1225 d. 1574). Aquinas, a Dominican friar, accepted
Aristotle’s conclusions and blended them into Christian philosophy. He consequently
was made a saint by the Catholic church in 1323. His emphasis on Aristotle’s conclusion
contributed to the conflict between the church and science at the time of Galileo. Roger
Bacon, a Franciscan friar, in contrast to Aquinas emphasized the empirical aspect of
Aristotle’s work. Bacon’s procedure15 of hypothesize, test against experiment, refine and
retest is the precursor of the scientific method and is very similar to the model building
and testing procedure described in this work. Bacon essentially discovered the scientific
method. However, Bacon’s ideas were largely ignored for several generations. It seems
that, then as now, people prefer the convenient answer from an authority even if it is
wrong to a reliable procedure even if it leads to better knowledge. Therein lies the danger
in the appeal to authority.
Scientific Induction: For much of the history of science, from Galileo to Einstein,
the scientific method was considered to be scientific induction. Scientists began with
observations, cautiously proceeded to a tentative hypothesis describing the observation,
progressed to more secure but still provisional theories, and only in the end achieved,
after a long process of verification, the security of permanent laws. In 1904 Newton’s laws
of motion and gravity would have been considered the prime example of permanent laws
derived by induction. One year later they were no longer considered exact, at least not
by Einstein. Twenty years later, not only had general relativity shown Newton’s laws of
gravity to be approximate but quantum mechanics had undermined much of the philos-
ophy built up around classical mechanics. The clock work universe dissolved in quantum
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uncertainty. The models in science are frequently built up by looking for patterns in past
observation and extrapolating these to future observations. The main error in scientific
induction is assuming the deduced law is permanent infallible knowledge. The induced
patterns are modified based on the new observations and the procedure repeated. As the
quantum replacement of classical mechanics illustrated no model can ever be assumed
absolutely true just because it has passed all the tests to the present time. In addition
the procedure for going from observations to a model is not always straight forward or
algorithmic. Rather it is a creative activity. General relativity was not deduced from
experiment in any simple way. Rather it was sheer genius on Einstein’s part.
Paradigm Shifts: A paradigm,16 the set of interlocking assumptions and methodolo-
gies that define a field of study, is also a model. It is the main model in a field of study
and sometimes referred to as the controlling narrative. The overarching model, control-
ling narrative or equivalently the paradigm provides the foundation for all work in the
field and a common language for discourse. While observations exist independent of the
paradigm, their interpretation depends on the paradigm. No natural history nor any set
of observation can be interpreted or even usefully discussed without the framework pro-
vided by the paradigm. Paradigms determine the important questions to be considered.
They can also act to prevent progress when members of a community are too committed
to their current set of models.
Thomas Kuhn (b. 1922 d. 1996) discusses16 two kinds of science — normal science and
extraordinary science. Normal science is puzzle solving within the context of a paradigm
while extraordinary science is the overthrowing of the paradigm. The present analysis
gives a different view of the distinction although the distinction itself remains useful.
In extraordinary science the model being challenged is the main model in the field, the
paradigm (or model) which provides the framework for the field. In normal science it
is the subsidiary models, those models that in principle could be derived from the main
model, that are being tested. Normal science can often resemble scientific induction
with models apparently deduced from observations. This is especially true in cases like
the color of crows or the period of a pendulum where a regularity is apparent in the
observations.
Extraordinary science generates paradigm shifts, a change in the world view in the
given field. This change of world view is closely related to Kuhn’s incommensurability16
(see also Feyerabend17). Proponents of the new model and the old model use a different
language and different concepts. They have different ideas about what the important
questions are. Their whole framework for understanding observations is different. Hence,
it may be difficult to compare the old and new models in detail. Despite these dramatic
differences, the old models are frequently good approximations to the new model for a
limited range of observations. By approximation I mean that the new and old models
give nearly identical predictions for some range of observations.
Paradigm shifts do not occur because the old paradigm is falsified nor because the new
paradigm is proven correct. It is not even because the practitioners have grown tired of
the old paradigm. Rather it is because the new paradigm or model ranks higher than the
old paradigm based on parsimony and its ability to correctly describe past observations
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and predict new ones. In the end this is what science always reduces to.
Falsification: Popper claims13 that models can not be proven correct but they can be
proven incorrect. The problem here is that no theory or model exists in isolation but is
always supported by subsidiary theories and models. Thus any test is not just of one
model but of all the subsidiary ones simultaneously. This objection to falsification is
known as the Duhem-Quine thesis.18 There is also the question of the interpretation of
the observations and the possibility of modifications to the model to remove the incorrect
prediction. With enough imagination any negative result can be explained away. The
white crow is really a black crow covered with snow or the sun is reflecting (specular
reflection) off the black crow in such a way it looks white. However, modifying models to
circumvent falsification usually reduces their predictive power. In the case of creation-
ist natural history and the Omphalos hypothesis it prevents any meaningful prediction.
While the Omphalos hypothesis can “explain” any observation, it is consistent with any
possible observation and has no predictive power. Contrary to the impression given by
some histories of science, the 1887 Michelson-Morley experiment did not immediately fal-
sify the ether model. A 1902 high school physics text book19 defines physics as: “Physics
is the science which treats of matter and its motion, and of vibrations in the ether”. Al-
though they developed the mathematics needed for special relativity neither Lorentz nor
Poincare´ abandoned the ether. Creative people came up with explanations such as ether
entrainment and the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction to explain the unexpected results.
Both explanations reduced the ether’s predictive power. Ether entrainment say that the
ether is dragged along by the earth. Thus the measured speed of light depends on how
strongly the ether is entrained and accommodates a wide range of values rather than the
single number of the original ether model. Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction adds an extra
assumption that does not lead to other new predictions. Thus it added an assumption for
this one type of observation and the number of predictions per assumption decreased. In
the end, the ether model was eliminated, not directly by observation, but by Einstein’s
special theory of relativity which had fewer assumptions and more predictive power than
the competing model. Using observations as the criteria, special relativity ranked higher
than the ether model. In general, models are not disproven by observations but are
replaced by newer models with more predictive power.
In cases like the ether or special creation the loss of predictive power resembles fal-
sification. In many cases falsification can be considered a useful approximation to the
more general procedure of model testing through predictive power. To some extent the
difference with Popper is one of emphasis.
Natural Explanations/Methodological Naturalism: One view is that science is
trying to provide natural explanations of phenomena. Thus we have to define natural and
explanation. One commonly accepted distinction is between natural and super-natural.
Natural is what science has described and super-natural is what it has not described.
In the present context this usage would be circular since we are trying to describe the
scientific method. When the term “natural explanation” is used in science it is frequently
a code for “explanations” of the form “God did it” are rejected.
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The related term naturalism has two distinct meanings. One is that the super-natural
is rejected and not dealt with or claimed to be nonexistent. The other meaning is that
all phenomena are treated equally whether or not they are natural or super-natural.
This second definition has the great advantage that it does not require the artificial
distinction between natural and super-natural. In the current context, as in marketing,
natural and naturalism have mainly a rhetorical value. What we want to exclude from
science is not the supernatural but rather assumptions that have no predictive power.
This is the only reason to reject the “Because God did it that way” type of model.
However, the “Because God did it that way” explanation rarely has predictive power
so in practice the “super-natural explanations” do end up being rejected. As Laplace
said20 in response to Napoleon’s question on why his books on celestial mechanics had
no reference to God: “je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothe´se-la`”. He did not say he
rejected it because science is methodological naturalism. That would have been poor
methodology, then or now. The important point is that the rejection is done a posteriori
not a priori. The foes of science have effectively used the methodological naturalism
description of science to score rhetorical points: Scientists have closed minds, they reject
my hypothesis out-of-hand without giving it a fair hearing. Thus it is important to reject
methodological naturalism as the definition of the scientific method while realizing, along
with Laplace, that something very similar follows from the model building and testing
procedure. However, if a supernatural model makes clear, unambiguous and precise
predictions for observations, by all means, science must consider it.
The discussions in this paper should not be taken to imply that science and religion
are intrinsically antagonistic. They are not. Science is the development and testing of
models based on observation. Religion, in its epistemological content, is the development
and testing of models against divine revelation. There is no reason a priori that these
two approaches should be conflict. To the theist or deist science is just the studying
of Gods work as made manifest through observation. The conflict between science and
religion is purely a posteriori. Some proposed divine revelations are inconsistent with
observation. As discussed previously we are justified in rejecting such proposed divine
revelations as being false. Thus science is only in conflict with false religions, actually
only with a subset of false religions — those that are inconsistent with observation.
“Explanation” is an equally rhetorically loaded word that is best avoided. It carries
the idea of understanding. An explanation is something that gives the hearer the im-
pression that he understands the phenomena. This is a very subjective criterion. Does
quantum mechanics explain or describe quantum entanglement? Do I need the many-
worlds interpretation to “really” understand quantum mechanics? Is everything else just
cookbook physics without real understanding? Does evolution just describe the origin
of the species and do we need intelligent design to “really” explain it? These questions
cannot be uniquely answered. They depend on what a person thinks is needed for a
satisfactory explanation. If we take the role of science to be providing explanations this
lack of uniqueness is a serious problem. Many worlds and supernatural explanations
can only be eliminated by fiat rather than as part of the more general procedure. The
model building and testing procedure avoids the problem. Nothing is rejected by fiat.
The scientific method is not making explanations but building models and testing them.
Subjective criteria, like what constitutes an explanation, are avoided. We construct the
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model and compare it with other models using observations and simplicity as the criteria.
This may sound cookbook like — just follow the instructions, but in science there are
only the two criteria: parsimony and comparison against observation.
Models constructed using parsimony and comparison against observation are fre-
quently considered to be explanations, especially by observers who have grown up with
them. Newton’s law of motion are generally accepted as explanations of planetary mo-
tion in contrast to the Ptolemaic and Copernican models which are considered only
descriptive. However, it is more precise to say that Newton introduced a higher level of
abstraction using ideas farther removed from the observations. It is this higher level of
abstraction that allows the models to be taken as explanations. However the role of sci-
ence is not to provide explanations, a subjective concept, but to build models. Providing
explanations is seductive but the ultimate insult to a scientific model is this: It explains
everything, but predicts nothing!
Anything Goes: In areas of science that are undergoing active development we are
faced with incomplete data, wrong data, approximate models and general confusion. It is
like doing a jig-saw puzzle with some pieces missing, some pieces from a different puzzle
and the picture on the box being wrong in undisclosed ways. Out of this the scientist tries
to find order by constructing models. In the jig-saw analogy he is trying to construct the
picture that should be on the box. The construction of the new models requires judgment
on which data are correct and most relevant. It requires selective abandonment of old
models. For example, Galileo had to replace the Aristotelian laws of motion in order to
make the Copernican model work. The acceptance of statistical mechanics was delayed
because the physicists of the time assumed Newtonian mechanics was correct while in
the end quantum mechanics was required. From the general confusion in a developing
area it is not surprising that Paul Feyerabend(b. 1924, d. 1994) concluded17 that there
was no method in science. Hence the title of his book: “Against Method: Outline of an
Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge”. To this extent he is correct: models are not derived
by any logical procedure. Model creation is indeed chaotic requiring creativity, good
judgment and even good taste as to what is important and relevant. However, above the
chaos sit two judges: predictive power and simplicity. In the end, order emerges from the
chaos by insisting the models be as simple as possible and that they make predictions
that can be tested against future observations.
The EPR view of Science Although Lorentz and Poincare´ developed the mathe-
matics for special relativity they were unable to accept that the ether was unnecessary.
This crucial insight was made by Einstein who was thus credited with the discovery of
special relativity. In turn, Einstein helped lay the foundation for quantum mechanics but
was unable to accept its implications. In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published
a paper21 (the EPR paper) on quantum mechanics stressing its incompleteness when
judged using classical concepts. While usually used to judge interpretations of quantum
mechanics it provides an interesting insight into the concept of the scientific method of
that time. This paper preceded the work of Kuhn16 and Popper13 by more than twenty-
five years. In contrast to these later developments in the understanding of the scientific
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method, the EPR paper presents a very nineteenth century view of science. For example
the second paragraph begins with:
In attempting to judge the success of a physical theory, we may ask ourselves
two questions: (1) “Is the theory correct?” and (2) “Is the description given
by the theory complete”
Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is certainly not correct in an absolute sense since
it does not include relativity. Even quantum field theory, which is consistent with spe-
cial relativity, is not correct in an absolute sense since it is not consistent with general
relativity. Thus the answer to the first question is “No”. This is true of most physical
models and will continue to be true until we have a theory of everything. Even then we
will be unable to demonstrate that the answer is “Yes” because all scientific knowledge is
tentative. In addition to being tentative knowledge is also approximate.3,1 Since science
is the art of the reasonable approximation a better question would be: “Is the model
approximately correct?”.
The EPR paper defines completeness in terms of reality which in turn requires reality
to be defined. The whole emphasis on reality runs counter to Kuhn’s16 idea that ob-
servations take their meaning from models. Reality in classical mechanics and quantum
mechanics are inherently different in line with Kuhn and Feyerabend’s17 contention that
different paradigms are incommensurate. There is not a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the concepts in different models even when they are given the same names. We can
say quantum mechanics is quantum mechanically complete but not complete according
to the concepts of classical mechanics. There is no reason it should be since the concepts
of reality and completeness are different (incommensurate) in the two models. If string
theory is even approximately correct, reality is something peculiar happening in some
weird number of dimensions. This is different from reality in either classical or quantum
mechanics.
The questions asked in the EPR paper should be compared with the Niels Bohr’s
understanding:22 “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical de-
scription. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is.
Physics concerns what we can say about nature.” This is a rejection of the absolutism
implied by the EPR questions. In light of the tentative and approximate nature of phys-
ical models and the incommensurate nature of the concepts in different models, EPR’s
two questions should be replaced by one question: “How much predictive power does
the model have?” This would destroy much of the force of the paper as an attack on
quantum mechanics. However quantum entanglement, which was introduced in the EPR
paper, is a very interesting and has stimulated much productive research. .
Science and technology There is sometimes confusion between what is science and
what is technology. Science is the development of models with predictive power. Technol-
ogy is the use of these models to build devices to serve some function. The development
of technology frequently involves model building and testing using procedures very sim-
ilar to those used in science. Thus while the distinction between science and technology
is in principle clear, in practice it is not with some activities legitimately considered to
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be both. For example, while Edison was primarily a technologist, he produced some very
interesting science: for example the Edison effect relating to the current in light bulb
with an additional electrode. Although Edison saw no use for the effect it eventually
lead to the vacuum tube and the cathode ray tube.
The important part of science for technology is its ability to make correct predictions.
When the on switch is pushed we predict that the TV will turn on. Much science, both
pure and applied has to be correcte, in order for that to happen. Contrary to some
claims, the success of technology in building devices is a validation of science and the
predictive power of its models. Without this predictive power, which is the essence of
science, technological innovation would slow to a barely perceptible crawl. In return,
technology allows science to address interesting new questions and answer old perplexing
questions.
6 Conclusion
The scientific method is the building of logical and self consistent models to describe
nature. The models are constrained by past observations and judged by their ability to
correctly predict new observations and interesting phenomena. Observations usually do
not prove or falsify models but rather provide a means to rank models. The observations
exist independent of the models but acquire their meaning from their context within a
model. Observations must be carefully done and reproducible to minimize errors. Models
assumptions that do not lead to testable predictions are rejected as unnecessary.
The alternate understandings of science and epistemology have been proposed at var-
ious times in human history. As argued in the previous section many of these can be
considered as approximations to the current understanding valid for a limited range of
situations, much like classical mechanics can be considered an approximation to quantum
mechanics. Among the rejected pretenders are appeal to authority, scientific induction,
falsification, paradigm shifts, natural explanations, methodological naturalism and any-
thing goes. The present description of science should also be considered tentative and
approximate.
The scientific method does not lead to sure and certain knowledge but rather to
approximate and tentative, but never-the-less useful, knowledge. This is the best that
can be done: General epistemological arguments, dating back to the ancient Greeks and
amplified at various times since, eliminate all claims to nontrivial sure and certain knowl-
edge. In all areas of knowledge, testing against observations is a powerful filter especially
when coupled with predictive power. This filter is particularly useful in eliminating
superstition, pseudo-science and bogus claims of divine revelation.
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